We consider stochastic differential games with N nearly identical players, linear-Gaussian dynamics, and infinite horizon discounted quadratic cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the existence of affine Nash equilibria by means of an associated system of N Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and N Kolmogorov-FokkerPlanck partial differential equations, proving that for small discount factors quadraticGaussian solutions exist and are unique. Then, we prove the convergence of such solutions to the unique quadratic-Gaussian solution of the pair of Mean Field equations. We also discuss some singular limits, such as vanishing noise, cheap control and vanishing discount.
Introduction
In this paper we consider an N -person differential game driven by a stochastic system of differential equations 
where X = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ R N d is the initial position of the dynamics, E denotes the expected value, ℓ is a positive discount factor, R is a positive definite symmetric d × d matrix, and we set 
with
for suitable N d × N d symmetric matrices Q i and suitable reference positions X i ∈ R N d . The notation Q i jk (j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N }) is used for the d × d block matrices of Q i . In (2) and (3), we denoted with m 1 , . . . , m N the invariant measures associated to the processes X 1 t , . . . , X N t . In other words, we are assuming that the cost J i depends directly on the state of the i-th player only, while the other players only influence the cost through their asymptotic distribution in the environment, since f i represents an average of the quadratic cost F i w.r.t. the invariant measures of other players. The standing assumptions on the game (1)- (2) are summed up in the following conditions.
(H1) The matrix σ in (1) is invertible, the matrix R is symmetric and positive definite and the matrices Q i in (4) are symmetric.
(H2) There exist matrices Q, B, C 1 , . . . , C N , D 1 , . . . , D N and vectors ∆, H such that block matrices and reference states in (4) satisfy for all i
(H3) The matrix A is symmetric and there exist constants r, k > 0 such that R = r I d and ν := σ T σ 2 = k I d . In [2, 3] games satisfying (H2) were referred to as games with "nearly identical players". Notice that for such games we can rewrite (4) as
which, in particular, means that each player cannot distinguish among other players and tries to reach his happy state H while pushing all competitors towards a common state ∆. For games of the form (1)- (2), we study in this paper the existence of Nash equilibria through the solutions of an associated system of 2N Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB, in the following) and Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equations where the unknown v i , m i represent respectively the value function for the i-th player and its invariant measure (with a slight abuse of notations, we denote with m i a measure as well as its density), and div is the divergence operator. In view of the Linear-Quadratic structure of the game, we look for solutions of the HJB-KFP system in the class of quadratic value functions and multivariate Gaussian distributions. This produces Nash equilibria for (1)- (2) in the form of affine feedbacks.
Our result for these games is that, for small values of the discount factor ℓ > 0, there exists a unique Quadratic-Gaussian (abbreviated QG later on) solution to (5) and thus a unique affine Nash equilibrium strategy. Moreover, we rigorously prove that, as the number of players N tends to infinity, QG solutions of (5) converge to solutions of the Mean Field PDE system
for a suitable integral operatorV mapping probability measures into quadratic polynomials of the variable x. This latter result perfectly matches the ones obtained by Lasry & Lions in their seminal papers [13, 14, 15] about differential games on the torus T d , and the ones on ergodic LQ games in R and R d (see [2] and [3] , respectively). Then, we investigate the relation between the games with discounted cost (2) and the ones with long-time-average cost functional studied in [3] . Namely, using the same notations as above, we consider the ergodic cost
whose affine Nash equilibria were characterized in [3] through the study of the corresponding HJB and KFP equations. Here, we prove that the QG solutions giving Nash equilibria for the game (1)-(2) converge as ℓ → 0 + to the corresponding QG solutions for the game (1)- (6) , as in the case of classical differential games. Moreover, we prove that the limit procedures as ℓ → 0 + and as N → +∞ commute. Finally, we investigate other singular limits procedures, and prove that the deterministic (ν → 0) and cheap cost (R → 0) limits for the games with ergodic cost (1)-(6) do commute with the mean field limit (N → +∞).
Linear-Quadratic differential games have a large literature, see the books [4, 6] and the references therein. The Lasry-Lions approach to MFG, originally introduced in [13, 14, 15] , has found application to several different contexts spanning from numerical methods [1] , to discrete games [7] , to financial problems [8] . Large population limits for multi-agent systems were also studied independently by Huang, Caines and Malhame [9, 10, 11] . They introduced a method named "Nash certainty equivalence principle" that produces a feedback from a meanfield equation, and shows that such control gives an approximate Nash equilibrium for the N -person game if N is large enough. We cannot review here the number of papers inspired by their approach, but let us cite [5, 17] for LQ problems, [18] for recent progress on nonlinear systems, [12] on the rate of convergence as N → ∞, and the references therein. In particular, we mention that [11, 17] deal with discounted infinite horizon games as the ones we are considering here. There are some differences between our results and the ones in the cited papers, though. In [11, 17] more general costs J i are allowed, explicitly depending on other players' states X j , but only the existence of approximate Nash equilibria is established. Here, we trade off the generality of the cost to prove existence of exact Nash equilibria for the game, and to prove the relation between N -players games and their mean field limit, as N → +∞. More details will be discussed in section 6.3.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we recall some preliminary facts for symmetric matrices, algebraic Riccati equations and LQ games (1)- (6) . Section 3 is devoted to the existence of Nash equilibria for infinite horizon differential games with discounted cost (1)- (2) . Section 4 contains the results about singular limits as ν → 0 (deterministic limit), R → 0 (cheap control) and ℓ → 0 + (vanishing discount). Finally, section 5 contains the proofs of the results and section 6 discusses extensions and open problems.
Notations and preliminaries

Matrices and eigenvalues
In the following, we will use the notation Mat m×n (R) for the linear space of real m × n matrices, I d ∈ Mat d×d (R) for the identical d × d matrix and spec(A) for the spectrum of a matrix A. The linear subspace of real symmetric d × d matrices will be denoted by Sym d and, for M ∈ Sym d , we say that M is positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite) if for all x ∈ R d there holds 
defines a norm. In particular, M = max spec(M ) whenever M is positive semidefinite. Also, eigenvalues of a matrix depend continuously on its coefficients (see e.g. [19] ) so that, for instance, given a sequence of symmetric matrices A n → A, the sequences of the minimal and maximal eigenvalues of A n converge, respectively, to min spec(A) and max spec(A). We conclude with a property that will be used in the rest of the paper (cf again [19] ).
Then, HK is diagonalizable with real eigenvalues and the number of positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of HK is equal to the number of positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of H. The same holds for KH.
Admissible strategies and Nash equilibria
Definition 2.1 A strategy α i is said to be admissible (for the i-th player) if it is a bounded process adapted to W i t such that the corresponding solution X i t to (1) satisfies
T ] are both bounded on [0, T ] for every T ;
• X i t is ergodic in the following sense: there exists a probability measure
locally uniformly w.r.t. the initial state X i 0 , for all functions g which are polynomials of degree at most 2.
In [3] it was shown that all affine strategies α i (x) = K i x + c i with K i ∈ Mat d×d (R) such that the matrix A − K i has only eigenvalues with negative real part, and c i ∈ R d , are admissible. Namely, considering α is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the N -person game with dynamics (1) and cost J i given by either (6) or (2), if for every index i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and for every admissible strategy α i for the i-th player there holds
The Nash equilibrium is said to be symmetric if all the players adopt the same strategy.
Algebraic Riccati equations
We recall here some basic facts about algebraic Riccati equations (ARE in the following).
Proposition 2.2 Consider the ARE
with R ∈ Sym (ii) If the matrix H has no purely imaginary nonzero eigenvalues, then equation
(iii) If (9) has symmetric solutions, then there exists a unique symmetric solution Y with
In particular, if H has only real nonzero eigenvalues, then there exists a unique symmetric solution Y such that spec(A + RY ) = spec(H) ∩ (0, +∞) .
The proof follows from standard arguments about Riccati equations that can be found in [6, 16] . We give here some explicit references for sake of completeness. Part (i) is contained in Proposition 7.1.1 of [16] . Part (ii) is a particular case of Theorem 8. 
Results for LQ games with ergodic cost
In view of the study of the singular limits, we review the results obtained in [3] for LQ differential games with ergodic costs. We start by noticing that, for the games (1)- (6), all players share the same Hamiltonian given by
Since the minimum is attained at
Therefore, the system of HJB-KFP equations associated to the game is given by
where the unknown v i , m i represent respectively the value function for the i-th player and its invariant measure, and λ i is a real number representing the outcome of the game for the i-th player. Here tr and div are respectively the trace of a matrix and the divergence operator. In order to formulate the algebraic conditions which characterize the existence of QuadraticGaussian (QG in the rest of the paper) solutions to (11), we need the following definition. 
is also a solution of the Sylvester equation
The first result for N -players games (1)-(6) satisfying (H1) and (H2) was the following (cf Theorem 2 in [3] ): The system of 2N HJB-KFP equations (11) admits a unique solution
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ, Σ, with Σ positive definite, and suitable vectors µ, ρ, which are in common for all the players, if and only if (A, ν, R, Q) satisfy the Riccati-Sylvester property in the sense of Definition 2.3 and the matrix B := Q+
is invertible. Moreover, the affine feedbacks α i = α := R −1 ∇v, for i = 1, . . . , N , provide a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy for all initial positions X ∈ R N d and J i (X, α) = λ i for all X and all i. In particular, by going through the proof of this Theorem in [3] , one sees that the coefficients Λ, Σ, ρ, µ are determined by solving the following algebraic relations
with P := QH + (N − 1) B 2 ∆, and
µ with
In order to study the behavior of QG solutions of (11) as N → +∞, we assume for simplicity that the control system, the costs of the control and the reference positions are always the same, i.e. that A, σ, R, H and ∆ are all independent from the number of players N . We also denote with
, the primary and secondary costs of displacement, respectively, which are assumed to depend on N . Concerning these quantities, we require that they tend to suitable matricesQ,B,Ĉ,D with their natural scaling, i.e., that as N → +∞ there hold
If we define an operator on probability measures of R d by setting for all measures m ∈ P(R d )
then it is possible to verify that, as N → +∞, the solutions v (11) tend to solutions of the system of mean field equations
like in [2, 13, 15] . Namely, if we assume that
the following facts hold (cf Theorem 3 in [3] ). First of all, the system (18) admits a unique solution (v, m, λ) of the form 
For later use, we also remark that the coefficients Λ, Σ, ρ, µ in (20) are determined by solving the following algebraic relations
with P ∞ :=QH +B 2 ∆, and λ =F (Σ, µ) + tr(νRνΣ + νRA) − µ T ΣνRνΣ 2 µ, witĥ
3 Discounted problems
In this section, we extend the analysis of [3] to the case of infinite horizon N -person games
with discounted costs
which satisfy (H1)-(H3). In this case, the associated system of 2N HJ-KFP equation takes the form 
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ ℓ , Σ ℓ , with Σ ℓ positive definite, vectors µ ℓ , ρ ℓ and numbers c , for x ∈ R d and i = 1, . . . , N , provide a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy for (23)-(24), for all initial positions X ∈ R N d .
The proof is quite technical and it is deferred to section 5. Here we mention that, similarly to the results in section 2.4, the coefficients
where F i is the function defined by (16) and Σ ℓ and µ ℓ solve respectively
with R :=
Remark 3.2 Observe that the conclusion of Theorem 3.1 fails when ℓ is not small enough. Indeed, the ARE in (28) may fail to have solutions in Sym 
Since λ ∈ R is an eigenvalue of A ℓ + RY ℓ if and only if
To study the convergence of Nash equilibria as N → +∞, assume again that the coefficients A, σ, R, H and ∆ are all independent from the number of players N . Also, assume that the discount factor ℓ does not depend on N and that (17) 1, we expect that they converge, like for games with ergodic costs [2, 3, 13, 15] , to solutions of the system of two mean field equations
Along the lines of Theorem 3 in [3] (see also section 2.4), our main result for this system is the following, whose proof is given in section 5. 
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ, Σ, with Σ positive definite, vectors µ, ρ and c ∈ R if and only if the matrix B 
Singular limits
We collect in this section, some results on singular limit processes for the LQG N -person games and mean field games.
We start from the result on the vanishing discount limit, which shows the relation between the solutions found in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, and their limits as the discount factor ℓ tends to 0. We prove that the limit procedures as ℓ → 0 + and as N → +∞ commute and that both tend to the solution of the mean field equation for the problem with ergodic cost described in section 2.4. +B 2 is invertible. Then, the vanishing discount limit as ℓ → 0 + and the mean field limit as N → +∞ commute. Namely, denoting with (v 
where (v, m, λ) is the QG solution to (18).
Remark 4.1 As a byproduct of the previous proof, we have proved that as ℓ → 0 + the solution of HJB-KPF system for N -players games with discounted cost (23)-(24) converge to the solution of the corresponding system for N -players games with ergodic cost (1)-(6). The same holds for solutions of the Mean Field systems of PDE.
Next we consider the deterministic limit as k → 0 + (and hence as the noise matrix σ → 0) and we prove that such limit and the limit to the Mean Field PDE as N → +∞ do commute. +B 2 is invertible. Then, the deterministic limit as k → 0 + and the mean field limit as N → +∞ commute. Namely, denoting with (v 
where (v, m, λ) are given by
forV := 2Q + rA 2 ,μ := (V 2 +B) −1 2QH +B ∆ andF defined as in (22).
Finally, we study the limit when the cost for the control r → 0 + , and thus large control can be chosen at cheap cost. Even if equations in (11) become singular when r tends to zero, we can still use the formulas we found in the previous section to study the limit behavior. Then, the cheap control limit as r → 0 + and the mean field limit as N → +∞ commute. Namely, denoting with (v 
forV := 2Q,μ := (V 2 +B) −1 2QH +B ∆ andF defined as in (22).
Technical proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Step 1. By simply inserting the expressions of v i and m i into (25), one can transform the system of 2N equations into a system of equalities between quadratic forms to be satisfied for all x ∈ R d . Thus, by equating the coefficients of these quadratic forms, (25) reduces to algebraic relations (26)-(28) among the coefficients of v i and m i . It is now clear that if we show that there exists a unique solution in Sym + d to ARE in (28) for small ℓ, then the existence and uniqueness part of the theorem would be proved. Indeed, the invertibility of B ℓ is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of solutions for the linear system (28), and once Σ ℓ and µ ℓ are uniquely determined, conditions (26) and (27) also give unique choices for Λ ℓ , ρ ℓ , c i ℓ . We therefore focus our attention on the ARE in (28). By Proposition 2.2, solutions to (28) can be found as the d-dimensional invariant graph subspaces of the 2d × 2d matrix H ℓ introduced in (29). Noticing that we have A ℓ → 0 and Q ℓ → Q = Q + r A 2 2 , as ℓ → 0 + , it is immediate to see that
and that H has d strictly positive and d strictly negative eigenvalues. This latter property follows from the fact that λ ∈ spec(H) if and only if λ 2 ∈ spec(RQ) and that Proposition 2.1 implies spec(RQ) ⊂ (0, +∞) because both R and Q are positive definite. Therefore, all (possibly complex) eigenvalues of H ℓ will converge to some eigenvalue of H, and there existsl > 0 small enough so that H ℓ has no non-zero purely imaginary eigenvalues when ℓ <l. Propositions 2.2(ii) allows to conclude that ARE (28) admits symmetric solutions for ℓ <l.
Owing to Propositions 2.2(iii), we also deduce that (28) has a unique symmetric solution Y ℓ such that the eigenvalues of A ℓ + RY ℓ with non-zero real part are exactly the eigenvalues of H ℓ with positive real part. But
is symmetric, so its eigenvalues are real and so are the ones of H ℓ . Using (10), we obtain
By setting δ := min spec(H) ∩ (0, +∞) > 0 and possibly reducingl, we have for ℓ <l
Hence,
We claim that such a solution is also unique. Indeed, if any solution Z ℓ ∈ Sym Step 2. It remains to verify that affine feedback strategies
give a Nash equilibrium for the game (23)-(24). Indeed, by applying Dynkin's formula,
T ) → 0 as T → +∞, because the value function is quadratic and the strategies are admissible, we get
where we have used Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem in the last equality. Noticing that equality holds only for α i = α i , we can conclude that the cost corresponding to any unilateral change of strategy α i (the r.h.s. of (37)) is larger than the cost corresponding to α i , and we have proved that (α 1 , . . . , α N ) is a Nash equilibrium strategy. ⋄ Proof of Theorem 3.2.
Step 1. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, from imposing the expressions (31) in (30), we find that the coefficients Λ, Σ, ρ, µ satisfy the conditions (26)- (28) with Q replaced byQ and with B ℓ replaced by B ∞ ℓ . We can therefore repeat the arguments of the previous proof to show part (a). In particular, we can assume thatl > 0 is small enough to ensure that for ℓ <l there hold spec(H ℓ ) ⊂ R and, setting ε 2 := min spec Q + r
Step 2. Proceeding as in Theorem 4 in [3] , it is easy to prove thatB ≥ 0 is equivalent to the monotonicity of the operatorV [m] . Hence, we can repeat the arguments from [13, 15] to show the uniqueness property (b).
Step 3. As a preliminary step towards (c), observe that Q N →Q as N → +∞ implies
for N large enough, where ε is the value introduced in step 1 and we have used (38) Step 4. To pass to the limit as N → +∞, and complete the proof of part (c), let us concentrate first on the sequence of the AREs in (28) as N varies in N. We can observe that H N ℓ → H ℓ in (29), and that eigenvalues of H ℓ are real by our choice of ℓ. Thus, the sequence of matrices Σ N ℓ solving (28) is bounded w.r.t. the norm · of the largest eigenvalue, defined in (7), because
when N is large enough. There follows that Σ N ℓ has a converging subsequence Σ Nm ℓ whose limit
which is analogous to (28), except for havingQ in place of Q. If we could prove that Σ ℓ ∈ Sym + d , then we would have, by uniqueness in Sym + d of this limit ARE (which follows from (H1) and Proposition 2.2(iii)), that Σ ℓ coincides with the matrix Σ found in part (a) for the measure in (31). This additional property on Σ ℓ follows again by the continuity of the eigenvalues: we have seen in step 3 that for N m large enough we had
and this implies, as N m → +∞, min spec Σ ℓ > 0, so that Σ ℓ ∈ Sym + d and Σ ℓ = Σ. Now, we can pass to the limit N → +∞ also in the equation (28) 
i.e., µ N ℓ converges to the average vector µ found in part (a). We conclude by observing that the previous convergence results for Σ N ℓ and µ N ℓ allow to pass to the limit in (26) and (27) as well, so to obtain the convergence of the value function. ⋄ Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Step 1. We start by proving that, when passing to the limit as ℓ → 0 + in the discounted N -person game, the QG solution given in Theorem 3.1 converges to the QG solution of the N -person game (1)- (6) given in section 2.4. LetN ∈ N be fixed large enough so that the matrix
is invertible for N ≥N (compared to section 2.4, we added a superscript N in the notation to stress its dependence on the number of players). For any N ≥N , let us consider the discounted N -players game (23)-(24) and letl > 0 be the value found in Theorem 3.1. Since B
is not restrictive to assume thatl is small enough to have B N ℓ invertible for ℓ <l. First, we focus our attention on the ARE in (28) and we fix any sequence ℓ n → 0 + with ℓ n <l. By proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 above, we obtain that the sequence Σ ℓn of solutions of (28) in Sym + d is bounded, and that any convergent subsequence has limit belonging to Sym
and solving the ARE in (15) . Therefore, by uniqueness, we conclude that Σ ℓn converges to the solution Σ of (15) found in Theorem 2 of [3] . By passing to the limit ℓ → 0 + also in the equation for the average vector µ ℓ in (28), we obtain
i.e., µ ℓ converges to the average vector µ found in (15) . In turn, Σ ℓ → Σ and µ ℓ → µ together with (26), imply Λ ℓ → Λ and ρ ℓ → ρ to the coefficients Λ, ρ in (15). Finally, from (27) we deduce easily that c i → +∞, but also ℓ c i → λ i and ℓv
µ and F i given by (16) , as in section 2.4. Thus, we conclude
recovering the expected value function of the problem with ergodic cost.
Step 2. Now we study the limit as ℓ → 0 + of the mean field system (30), and we fixl > 0 small enough to have that ℓ <l implies invertibility of the matrix B ∞ ℓ , defined in Theorem 3.2. For games with ℓ <l, the part of step 1 about solutions of the ARE can be repeated, provided we replace Q withQ in the various formulas derived from (30). Namely, we can prove that the positive definite solutionsΣ ℓ converge, as ℓ → 0 + , to the matrix Σ ∈ Sym + d which solves ARE in (21). Then, by passing to the limit in the equation for the average µ ℓ in (21), we obtain
The remaining coefficients converge like in step 1. In particular, ℓv ℓ → λ =F (Σ, µ)+tr(νRνΣ+ νRA) − µ T ΣνRνΣ 2 µ, withF given by (22), as in section 2.4.
Step 3. By combining step 1 with the result on the mean field system (18) (14), we look for solutions to the HJB-KFP system (11) satisfying
for suitable matrices V ∈ Sym + d , Λ ∈ Mat d×d (R) and vectors µ, ρ ∈ R d , which are the same for all the players. Here, γ is a normalization constant explicitly given by (2π) −d/2 det(V −1 ). By plugging these expressions into system (11), or by setting V = k √ r Σ in the proof of Theorem 2 of [3] , one finds that the coefficients Λ, V, ρ, µ must satisfy
where P := 2Q N H + (N − 1)B N ∆ , and
with F i as in (16) . It is immediate to check that, under our assumptions, the first two equations in (43) admit unique solution in Sym 
Since (43) do not depend on k, the same is true for the value function v i and for the mean vector µ. Only the value λ i in (44) is modified by a change of k. Passing finally to the limit as
in the correct topologies, with V and µ given by (45).
Step 2. Analogous computations can be performed for the mean field equations (18) . In this case, the expression (35) for the value function remains valid as k → 0 + , and it is easy to verify
→ δμ in distributional sense. Since we also have
it is enough to pass to the limit as N → ∞ in the formulas (45) to complete the proof. ⋄ As r → 0 + , we thus have V r → V = 2Q N . Similarly, by passing to the limit in the equation (43) for µ, we obtain
which in turn implies Λ → 0 and ρ → 0. It is also simple to verify that the measures m i converge in distributional sense to a Dirac delta δ µ , centered at µ, and that λ
2 µ, as in the deterministic limit.
Step 2. Fixed r > 0 small enough to have invertibility of the matrix B ∞ :=Q + r A 2 2 +B 2 , we repeat the argument used in step 1 for the mean field equations (18) . In this case, we get
withV r := 2Q + rA 2 andμ r := (V 2 r +B) −1 2QH +B ∆ . Then, as r → 0 + we obtain the convergence of v r and m r to the value function and the measure in (36). From
also the convergence of λ r follows. Finally, by passing to the limit as N → +∞ in the formulas in step 1, it is immediate to prove V →V and µ →μ, whence the conclusion follows. ⋄
Extensions and open problems 6.1 Games with N different players
For sake of notational simplicity, in this work we have focused our attention on games satisfying (H2), i.e. games with nearly identical players (see also Definition 4.1 in [3] ). However, some of the results we have presented admit a straightforward generalization to games whose cost for the player's state (4) consists of more general matrix coefficients Q i jk . The most interesting extension is probably the characterization of affine Nash equilibria strategies for general games with discounted cost (2). We replace assumptions (H1)-(H3) with the following (H) The matrix σ is invertible and the matrix R belongs to Sym 
is invertible, δ αβ being the Kronecker delta. Moreover, the affine feedbacks α i (x) = R −1 ∇v i (x), for x ∈ R d and i = 1, . . . , N , provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for the game (1)-(2), for all initial states X ∈ R N d .
The proof proceeds along the same lines of the one for Theorem 3.1, and it is therefore omitted. Further extensions to games having matrices A i , σ i , R i and discount factors ℓ i also depending on the players just require changes in the corresponding notations.
Games not satisfying (H3)
Comparing the results presented in this paper with the ones in [3] , one might easily wonder why the assumption (H3) is here imposed on some matrix coefficients in the dynamics and the cost. The answer is related to the algebraic Riccati equations whose solutions give the (inverse of the) covariance matrix of the desired Gaussian measure. Indeed, in the case of deterministic and cheap control limits, a large part of the manipulations done on the system (11) of HJB-KFP equations can still be repeated for games not satisfying (H3). By searching for solutions of the form
one finds relations similar to (43) and, in particular, we have that V must solve V T V = 2Q + A T RA. However, in this context we are not searching for solutions V ∈ Sym d anymore, but for a V which makes Σ := ν
For any fixed choice of the matrices ν and R, the existence and uniqueness result in Theorem 2 of [3] (see also section 2.4) allows to prove that a unique V with the required properties exists, and thus that a unique QG solution to (11) exists of the form (46), at least when (A, ν, R, Q) satisfy the Riccati-Sylvester property in the sense of Definition 2.3 and
B 2 is invertible. The problems for these more general games arise when we try to pass to the limit: Indeed, except for the simple extension mentioned in Remark 5.1, it is not clear whether the sequences of solutions converge, either as ν → 0 or as R → 0, to a specific limit matrix V among the many solutions of the limit ARE equation which is, respectively,
Analogous issues are found when studying the limits of mean field equations (18) . For the vanishing discount limit there is an additional difficulty, because it is not clear whether symmetric positive definite solutions to the ARE in (28) exist when (H3) is not satisfied. Indeed, the matrix A ℓ + RY ℓ = νR 2 ℓ 2 I d + νY ℓ , with Y ℓ ∈ Sym d given by Proposition 2.2(iii), might be not symmetric and have complex eigenvalues if we do not assume (H3). In this case, it does not seem possible to generally deduce Y ℓ > 0 from the estimates on the real part of eigenvalues of A ℓ + RY ℓ .
In our opinion, new results on the algebraic Riccati equations would be necessary to extend our analysis to more general games, but such extensions are beyond the scope of this work.
Comparison with previous works on infinite horizon games with discounted cost
For N -person infinite horizon games with discounted costs there is a rich literature (see [11, 17] and references therein). Typically, the games considered have a dynamics 
and cost
where A, B, D, R, Q ∈ Mat d×d (R) suitable matrices, R > 0 and Q ≥ 0, and where
with the term 1/N N j=1 X j t representing a sort of average position among the agents (referred to as the "mean field term" of the game). The typical result for these games is that the solution of a suitable "mean field system" of ODEs, obtained by formally passing to the limit as N → +∞ in the HJB equation for (47)-(48) and replacing the mean field term in the cost with a suitable deterministic function, provides an approximate Nash equilibria for the game (47)-(48). Namely, the feedback strategy corresponding to such a solution is an ε-Nash equilibrium strategy with ε = O The main difference is that the cost J i in (48) depends on other players directly through their state X j , while in (2) the dependence is present only through their asymptotic distribution m j in the environment. The novelty in our results is that, thanks to the particular form of the cost, we are able to characterize exact Nash equilibria for the discounted game (at least for small values of the discount factor ℓ) and not only of ε-approximate ones. Moreover, we prove rigorously the convergence of such Nash equilibria to the solutions of the mean field game. The analogous study in the case of games with cost (48) is still an open problem, to our knowledge.
